Northern Ireland found a gawk of hope for peace on April 10, 1998. This date marked the signing of the Superb Friday Agreement in Belfast by the Irish and British governments. The event was supposed to be a turning point in the long-standing conflict, commonly termed The Troubles, between Unionists (who favor continued inclusion of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom) and Nationalists (who favor unification with the Republic of Ireland) in the northern portion of Ireland. For the first time since the late 1960s, the agreement presented a resolution that seemed to satisfy most of the active terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland. Citizens who had been plagued by the violence and destruction that walked hand-in-hand with the competing paramilitary campaigns breathed a needed grunt of relief. The end to the century faded argument was in sight.

But, was it really? Were the goals and visions of this peace resolution too broad and unrealistic? It seems hard to imagine that a single document could end centuries of resentment, oppression, and deep-rooted hatred. Critics argue that the Good Friday Agreement is merely another overly optimistic, diplomatic endeavor designed to appease the population, but really only providing a temporary band-aid to an irresolvable situation. Other peace resolutions, such as the Sunningdale Agreement, fell apart shortly after conception. What was so different about the Good Friday Agreement?

The designers and supporters of the agreement argue that it provides the first realistic evaluation of the region, is the first attempt to include all sides of the argument, and sets forth the first great chance for peace. The Good Friday Agreement is not so much a solution, but the framework for the solution. It is important to note that the agreement is not an end-all resolution. It does not pretend to contain the solution to the Irish question. Its main unprejudiced is that of the movement from violent, terror-evoking practices to peaceful, political discussions of conflict. The importance of the agreement lies in the implementation of diplomatic measures. The document is worthless without the commitment of all involved parties to bringing about peace in Northern Ireland. The designers understood that this would not be an overnight transformation and sought to put into dwelling institutions to contribute to the long-term task of establishing peace in the region. The role that the agreement played in lessening the impact of terrorist groups in Northern Ireland was substantial. This essay explains the provisions that the Good Friday Agreement put forth and demonstrates their effectiveness in providing the framework for peaceful conflict management.

Outline of the Provisions

The First-rate Friday Agreement presented a solution that attempted to satisfy all involved parties. Rather than yield concessions to either the Unionists or the Nationalists, it outlined ways in which both parties could find mutual acquiescence. The first and most important resolution outlined is self-determination for the people of Northern Ireland. This goal was to be achieved by the establishment of three entities: the Northern Ireland Assembly, the North/South Ministerial Council, and the British-Irish Council.

Self-determination for the people of Northern Ireland primarily concerned their right to decide the future situation of Northern Ireland. Whether the area would remain part of the United Kingdom, join the Irish Republic, or seek independence would be a matter for the majority to decide. No future changes to the status of Northern Ireland could be implemented without consent of the people (Ingraham).

The establishment of the three entities was outlined in strands. The first strand called for a Northern Ireland Assembly. This assembly was “to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected” (The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, Strand One, Paragraph 5). It was a call for devolved home-rule for Northern Ireland, procuring more power for the people to rule themselves. It featured 108 members selected by proportional representation to be part of a power-sharing executive. It ensured the involvement of both Unionists and Nationalists in the administration of Northern Ireland through a model of consociationalism.

The second strand established the North/South Ministerial Council. This was a joint effort between North and South Ireland to “invent consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland – including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis – on matters of mutual interests within the competence of the Administrations…” (The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, Strand Two, Paragraph 1). These mutual interests included education, agriculture, transportation, health, tourism, and trade. It was to be comprised of meetings between ministers of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to discuss these interests and implement tiny governmental authority over issues concerning the entire island. Furthermore, this council was to be in consultation with the Northern Irish Assembly. The two were to be “mutually inter-dependent” (The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, Strand Two, Paragraph 13).

The final strand established the British-Irish Council. This group aimed at appeasing differences between the government “to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands” (The Gppd Friday (Belfast) Agreement, Strand Three, Paragraph 1). Essentially, this group served as a transition from the direct rule previously employed by Britain to the home-rule perform conceptualized in the Fine Friday Agreement.

Other issues addressed by the Good Friday Agreement concerned paramilitary organizations and a committed movement towards serene, diplomatic conflict resolution. The agreement called for the decommissioning of arms by all paramilitary organizations by the year 2000. Furthermore, it called for a release of paramilitary prisoners if the corresponding groups maintained ceasefires. A hope for a rights-based society was conveyed in the creation of the Human Rights Commission and an Equality Commission (Mandelson 117). The recount of corrupt law enforcement was also addressed and a provision was made for the establishment of “an independent Commission…to make recommendations for future policing arrangements in Northern Ireland including means of encouraging widespread community support for these arrangements”(The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, Policing and Justice, Paragraph 3).

The Good Friday Agreement sounds good in theory. Efforts were made to address both sides of the conflict and come to conclusions that seemed please everybody. However, did it translate to reality? How well were the provisions of the Generous Friday Agreement carried out? It is important to notice that the “implementation of agreements is as difficult and as important as reaching them” (Mitchell 89). The following sections see to understand how implementation and continued commitment to the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement has set in motion the political processes needed to ruin violence in Northern Ireland.

Self-Determination

Self-determination was established in the May 1998 Referenda. These referenda allowed the people of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to separately secure or reject the Good Friday Agreement. The agreement was overwhelmingly common in both areas. The passage of the agreement by the people was important for three reasons. First, it demonstrated the willingness of the people for a smooth solution. It showed that the general public did not support the violence and conflict that had been prominent for decades. Second, its acceptance gave the green light for the development of the institutional changes outlined. These institutional changes would be a key factor in bringing peace to the region. Lastly, “the people of the island of Ireland, for the first time in history, had, in effect, voted to accept the partition of the country” (Tonge 192). The Republic of Ireland and British Government had given up constitutional claims to the region and the people could now implement devolved legislative power.

Most of the opposition to the agreement came from half the members of the Unionist party, those who favor a continuation of the inclusion of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom (Cox 155). These Unionists argued that the agreement simply place up the precedent that would eventually lead to the creation of an all-Irish island. They use the second strand to argue this point, implying that the North/South Council encourages bi-nationalism and the “eventual Irish unity by stealth” (Tonge 186). However, for this to occur a majority would have to reach that decision and the Nationalists, being a minority, do not have that kind of support (Tonge 186).

Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive

The actualization of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive was quick. As soon as June 1998, elections were taking location, although the devolved powers did not come into place until December of 1999. The rapidly, immediate implementation was an early sign that the Good Friday Agreement would be a success. The peoples’ hopes of peace were enforced. However, they would be shaken again when the assembly suffered temporary suspensions, once in February 2000 and twice during the summer of 2001.

The last and recent suspension arose on 15 October 2002. The Ulster Unionist Party walked out in response to a police investigation of IRA offices under suspicions of spying. Direct rule was returned to Britain. A four-year political battle ensued. The decommissioning of arms by the IRA was the negotiating factor. Following the formal IRA decommissioning in July 2005, plans were made to restore devolved power to the Northern Ireland Assembly. A blue print was made for a transitional assembly that would serve until elections can be held in March 2007. The transitional assembly took its seats on 24 November 2006. Plans for an election are set for 7 March 2007 (“Timeline: Northern Ireland Assembly”).

Despite its turbulence, the fact that the Assembly is still in existence bodes for the effectiveness of the agreement (Kuusisto-Arponen 125). Furthermore, during the intermittent periods when the assembly is in session, they have made ardent strides towards dealing with issues such as security, social welfare, education, and economics (Kuusisto-Arponen 125). These are issues that the people of Northern Ireland have longed suffered with because of the lack of clear, local, representative legislation. The diplomatic negotiation of these issues promoted a peaceful alternative to terrorism and encouraged the continuation of these practices.

Perhaps most notable about the original Northern Ireland Assembly was its consociationalistic nature. “Consociationalism entails an institutionally based power-sharing agreement within government, brokered between clearly defined segments of society that may be joined by citizenship but divided by ethnicity, religion, and/or language” (Reynolds 620). In the case of Northern Ireland, consociationalism involved making positive representatives of all major political parties would be guaranteed a plot in the government. In the first elections, eight parties won seats: four Unionist parties, the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the Alliance Party and the Women’s Coalition. The diversity of these parties turned the Northern Ireland Assembly into a microcosm of the population as a whole. “In general, the Northern Irish Assembly elected in 1998 is younger, more forward looking, and more culturally diverse than any legislature that came before in the province” (Reynolds 624). Trust, compromise and communication are not only encouraged between the opposing parties, they are required for the government to function properly (Kuusisto-Arponen 126).

The power of minority veto is another important tool in the establishment of a peaceful Northern Ireland government. It encourages “cross community support” (Reynolds 617). Minority veto is distinguished as a counterterrorism tactic. It gives those with less political power a voice with the hopes that a resort to violence is unnecessary. By providing would-be terrorists with a viable peaceful alternative, Northern Ireland can lessen the attractiveness of attention-grabbing destructive tactics.

The Northern Ireland Assembly does not abet as a resolution to the competing interests of various political groups. It does not provide for a concise answer to all the troubles plaguing the community, nor does it encourage the parties to come to a conclusive treaty. Rather, the Northern Ireland Assembly encourages the opposing parties to continue their conflict, however in peaceful ways. The grievances of both sides of the conflict can be aired and dealt with accordingly. As Ted Robert Gurr explains “Once it becomes evident to an aggrieved minority that dominant groups are prepared to accommodate some of their demands, most are likely to execute that terrorism is a less dazzling strategy” (98). Given the obvious cultural, religious, and ethnic separations in Northern Ireland, there may never be an end to all the problems these divisions give rise to. However, there can be a civilized manner of dealing with problems. Thanks to the Northern Ireland Assembly, differences and disagreement do not have to equate to violence and destruction. Parties are given a political assure and the ability to conclude diplomatic resolutions.

North/South Ministerial Council and British-Irish Council

In the second strand of the Agreeable Friday Agreement a provision is made for a council between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. While this provision seems to be a blatant attempt at appeasement of Nationalists, it was notable to the inclusion of the Catholic Republican sector. It addressed the speak of the “Irish dimension” (Mandelson 116). The role of the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland could not be ignored. Something was needed to recognize the Irishness of the Nationalist minority so as to ease their grievances.

Unionists argued that this council was “a bridge too far” that would lead to the unity of the Irish isle that they had rigorously fought against (Hayes 96). However, the wording of the agreement limits how much the council could be expanded. Furthermore, without approval from the Northern Ireland Assembly, of which Unionists are a main component, no expansion could be reasonably and legally implemented (Tonge 186).

The council was officially established on 2 December 1999. The council has committed itself to combating issues that affect the whole of the island, such as transportation, education, agriculture, environment, health, and tourism. In August 2000, reports indicated that the level of cooperation between North and South was unprecedented since partition (“Good Friday Agreement”).

The success of the North/South Ministerial Council is promising. Continued cooperation is indispensable to the resolution of the conflicts given its inherent symbolism to Nationalists. However, the council can only prevail if inclusiveness and collaboration are continued. The state of decommissioning impeded the council in summer of 2000, when ministers of Sinn Fein were banned from participation in the council. However, the effectiveness of the peace process can be measured by the immediate determination of this ban as unlawful and inclusion of that Nationalist party.

The third new government body created in the Good Friday Agreement was the British-Irish Council. Implemented 2 December 1999, its main purpose was to develop consensus between the two islands. However, it has tiny if any actual power should dissention arise. The devolution of legislative rule from Britain to Northern Ireland was a major initiative. This council may succor as a transitional authority, easing the passage of power. The council is commonly regarded as a means of appeasing Unionist extremists and a balance to the North/South Ministerial Council. Unlike the North/South Ministerial Council, there is no relationship between the British-Irish Council and the Northern Ireland Assembly.

“It remains to be seen whether the BIC will be a forum in which policies on the agreed areas will be decided or whether its main function will be to co-ordinate policies between different parties involved” (“Good Friday Agreement”). In its first meeting the British-Irish Council position about assigning key areas of concern to different administrations. Ulster Unionist leader, David Trimble, called the meeting a “revolutionary political development.” However, several other intergovernmental organizations are already in existence, including the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Joint Ministerial Committee on Devolution.

The definite role of this strand of the agreement has yet to be seen. Some feel the BIC could become no more than a talking shop. However, its importance in developing relations and continued cooperation between Britain and Ireland cannot be ignored. It helps to resolve the issue of co-authority of Northern Ireland. Part of the Worthy Friday Agreement called for both Ireland and Britain to relinquish some of their claim on the region. The creations of the North/South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council are both attempts at moving Northern Ireland towards the “status of a bi-national state” (Tonge 189). Hopefully, the inclusion of both countries will help reduce the tensions between Unionists and Nationalists, in that each will have an equal voice in the rule of Northern Ireland. Inclusion of the Irish will appease Nationalists and inclusion of Britain will appease the Unionists.

Decommissioning

Originally a small portion of the Good Friday Agreement, the decommissioning of arms by paramilitary groups became one of the most controversial aspects. The voluntary decommissioning by these groups was an essential symbol that they were ready for peaceful resolutions to the conflicts. The use of illegal weapons by these terrorist groups is detrimental to the peace process for two reasons. Firstly, the destruction and death that the weapons are responsible for is immense. Secondly, even the possession of illegal arms ruins any chance the groups had at political trust (McInnes 78).

This was not the first time decommissioning had been attempted. Both the Irish and British governments had been working since 1990 to gain the release of weapons by terrorist groups, primarily the Irish Republican Army. Coupled with requests for ceasefires, there had been numerous failed attempts at turning paramilitary groups into peaceful political parties. Deals were made that if the groups relinquished their arms, they would be allowed into negotiations on political structures. However, numerous attempts had been found utterly unsuccessful. The IRA was unwilling to hand over their weapons.

The Good Friday Agreement originally called for this decommissioning to rob place two years after the May 1998 referenda; however, the process would be longer and harder than imagined. The ambiguous nature of the agreement itself added to the confusion surrounding the issue of decommissioning. Questions arose to the exact requirement of paramilitary groups to surrender their weapons and over exact links between paramilitary groups and political parties (Tonge 192).

Colin McInnes outlines the main issues that surround decommissioning. He states that all political parties were in agreement that decommissioning was an essential aspect to the peace process, but the who, what, and when were less certain.

The IRA had already made declarations of peace such as those by Gerry Adams that “the violence we have seen must be for all of us a thing of the past, over, done with and gone.” To the Unionists, promises by the IRA that they would not exercise violence were not enough. These promises had to be coupled with the decommissioning of arms. The Unionists insisted that for Sinn Fein to be allowed seats in the government, they must dissolve their arsenal (Tonge 193).

To Nationalists, the decommissioning of arms signified defeat and surrender. Complicating the issue was the blurry distinctions between the IRA and Sinn Fein. While the IRA was undoubtedly a terrorist, paramilitary organization, its links to Sinn Fein, a political party, were debated. Aroused that they were threatened exclusion from the assembly, Sinn Fein argued that the IRA was a separate entity over which they had no control. Along with this argument they said that the Good Friday Agreement did not require the party to get rid of its weaponry to be eligible for seats in the assembly (Tonge 193). They also argued that if “political processes were established violence would slip from the agenda and decommissioning would be unnecessary” (McInnes 85). Furthermore, republicans felt that if they had to give up their weapons, so did the security forces. The occupation of the British Army and the RUC were two of the biggest sources of discontentment for the Nationalists. They felt that decommissioning should be coupled with demilitarization (McInnes 90).

The release of paramilitary prisoners, a provision of the agreement marvelous to both sides, was used in the decommissioning negotiations. Tony Blair used the quick release of the prisoners as a trace that decommissioning was progressing to secure Unionist support. The IRA needed the release of prisoners as a symbol of trust – an indication of fulfilled promises – before they began the heavenly task of decommissioning. Yet another group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force bargained the decommissioning of a few weapons in exchange for the release of some its prisoners (McInnes 87).

Decommissioning was an ongoing debate that throttled the peace process from 1998 to 2005. All attempts at establishing a democratic, composed means of conflict resolution were put on halt until the issue of decommissioning was decided. The first glimpse of hope came in 2001 when the IRA agreed to have its arsenal inspected by the Internal Commission on Decommissioning. Slowly the IRA ceded more ground and in July 2005 announced an waste to its armed campaign (“UK: Northern Ireland IRA statement in full”). This was a gargantuan turning point in the peace process and state of terrorism in Northern Ireland. It showed a dramatic shift from violence to politics, one demonstrating that terrorism was no longer a necessary or effective means of conveying grievances in the region (Rowan). The announcement also offered renewed hope for the political structures created in the Good Friday Agreement. The Northern Ireland Assembly had been awaiting resolution of the issue of decommissioning to relieve the 2002 suspension and return devolved rule from Britain. Finally, the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement could begin to find roots in Northern Ireland.

Security Forces

Republicans have long had discontentment with the security forces in Northern Ireland, namely the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). They felt that the police force had long been biased towards the Unionists and found them guilty of harassment and discrimination. The Unionists on the other hand, have seen the RUC has a vital, heroic protection agency. A balance between the two viewpoints was needed. In order for the people of Northern Ireland to feel gain, a police force that equitably served all citizens was imperative. A radical depoliticizing of the police was needed (McGarry & O’Leary).

This revolutionary change that was proposed by the Good Friday Agreement was delegated to a newly created Independent Commission of Policing in Northern Ireland. The commission was created on 3 June 1998. Their first task was gaining consensus and the public opinion on police forces. From a grassroots-Style investigation and submitted proposals from all parties, the commission keep together a report on 9 September 1999. The report proposed radical changes and a complete overhaul of the police forces. The report was met with mixed reaction, but bills were passed to set the reorganization in motion. Two of the most symbolic amendments were the transition from the nomenclature RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the redesign of the badge so that it was free from association with either Unionists or Nationalists (“Apt Friday Agreement”).

The creation of this new, unbiased police force was an essential part of the Good Friday Agreement. The policing of Northern Ireland was an essential factor in suppressing terrorist groups and violent paramilitary activity in the region. “It is an area of enormous importance and sensitivity for all sections of the community, and it is impossible to envisage an overall settlement in which the issue is left unresolved” (“Patten blueprint”). The changes have allowed a means for squandering uprisings without the critiques and protests of unfair practices by different terrorist organizations.

Societal Changes

The creators of the Honorable Friday Agreement were not ignorant. They knew that a simple document was not enough to settle the conflicts in Northern Ireland. Terrorism cannot exist without a vulnerable local population to provide members and tolerance. As Jessica Stern explains, “…leaders can harness alienation and anomie to construct a group identity” (30). The alienation and the discrimination that Catholics had long felt contributed to the culture that promoted terrorist action in Northern Ireland. The agreement did not focus solely on constitutional and political changes. It was also concerned with an equality agenda and the promotion of human rights (Tonge 208).

One of the key creators of the agreement, U.S. Senator George Mitchell, said, “where men and women have no hope, no opportunity, they are more likely to take the path of violence” (90). A main concern was providing the people of Northern Ireland with the income needed to attend their families. Through a series of fair employment initiatives and equality legislation, such as the Human Rights Commission, the socioeconomic status of Catholics was addressed. Although these acts did little to curtail Unionist ideologies, it reduced the pool of likely candidates for Nationalists to draw from. Experiencing great economic equality, the venerable Catholic Nationalists had fewer complaints and cramped need for radical, paramilitary activity (Tonge 209). In response, Unionist groups, who had largely been in place to protect themselves against gross Nationalists, found less need for defensive actions.

Terrorism After Good Friday

It cannot be said that terrorism in Northern Ireland has completely ceased since the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. Indeed, terrorism and violence still threaten the people of the region. However, there has been a dramatic decrease in the quantity and morbidity of such attacks. The Superb Friday Agreement has left a distinguished impression on the reduction of armed campaigns by paramilitary terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland. This fragment will briefly outline the before-and-after status of some of the major players in the violent sector as well as highlight two of the groups that have emerged as a direct result of the agreement.

The largest and possibly most inferior terrorist organization on the Nationalist side has been the Irish Republican Army. The IRA is an advocate of unification with The Republic of Ireland and the creation of a socialist all-Ireland state. Its modern fledgling, the Provisional IRA, has been responsible for more than 1,800 deaths since its formation in 1969 (“Northern Ireland: the Troubles”). Leading up to the peace agreement of April 1998, the IRA had gone through several series of failed ceasefires. Fine Friday marked a watershed event for the IRA. The group willingly decided to move towards peaceful means of resolution. On 17 November 1999, a statement issued by the IRA claimed,

“The IRA is willing to further enhance the peace process and consequently, following the establishment of the institutions agreed on Good Friday last year, the IRA leadership will appoint a representative to enter into discussions with General John de Chastelain and the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning” (‘UK: Northern Ireland IRA statement in full”).

Although, publicly denouncing current terrorist activities, violent activities continued from 1998 to 2002. The last attack attributed to the group occurred on 29 September 2002 when the driver of a bus carrying prisoners was attacked; although, Sinn Fein has claimed the IRA had no involvement. Despite their reluctance, the group finally gave in to requests for decommission of arms and in July 2005 announced an end to their formal armed campaign, demonstrating a commitment to newly established goals of peace and compromise. Since the disarmament, strides have been made to include members of Sinn Fein, the political soar of the IRA, in the Northern Ireland Assembly with goals of decreasing the likelihood that the group will return to violent tactics (Terrorism Knowledge Inappropriate).

All IRA members did not favor the Good Friday Agreement. Some still believed in a violent, terrorist strategy and opposed the movement towards a peace resolution. One member said in reference to the agreement, “No procedure will it work…The Unionists will never agree to anything when it comes to the crunch, and the British will never force them to. So there’s only one device forward – physical force” (Coogan 705). In early 1998, two factions of disaffected IRA members emerged, the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA. Due to its size, the Continuity IRA has been unable to launch a large-scale campaign; however, its fervent commitment to violence makes them a valid threat (Terrorism Knowledge Base). The Real IRA took responsibility for the largest single terrorist attack since the agreement, the bombing of a courthouse in Omagh that killed 29 people. Despite claims in 2003 of a ceasefire, attacks as recently as 8 August 2006 have been attributed to the Real IRA (“Real IRA admits”).

These splinter groups demonstrated what those who were not committed to the peace process were capable of. So-called irreconcilables are dangerous because of their unrelenting commitment to violence and unwillingness for compromise. The groups are not immune, however, to the pressure for peaceful resolutions. The ceasefire that occurred immediately following the Omagh bombing was directly linked to statements by the IRA, like that of one spokesman who said, “The Real IRA should disband and they should do so sooner than later” (Coogan 705). Harvey Cox explains, “(W)hile republican militancy, as the Omagh bomb demonstrated, has the capacity to kill and disrupt, its capacity to derail the peace process is likely to be limited” (163).

The Unionists are not innocent of terrorist acts either. The Unionists support Britain’s continued role in Northern Ireland and wish to remain part of the United Kingdom. The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), also known as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), is the largest loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland. Since its formation in 1971, the group has been responsible for more than 250 deaths (“Northern Ireland: the Troubles”). Remarkably the group was able to maintain a legal status until the early 1990s. Prior to the Good Friday Agreement, the UDA had been under a ceasefire since 1994, although it had continually undertaken retaliatory attacks during that period. Its last attack was the 5 September 2004 assault of an 18-year-old Catholic boy (“Loyalists blamed for stabbing”). When the IRA began to stand down after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the UDA also reevaluated its methods. It underwent an internal purge of members and ceased most paramilitary activity in November 2005. Most of the current activity on behalf of the UDA has not resembled terrorist activity as great as it has organized crime. Extortion and drug trafficking are at the top of the agenda (Terrorism Knowledge Base). Still, the Northern Ireland government has recently undertaken new negotiations with the UDA and the UDA has made ardent strides in insisting on their turn towards peace (“Can UDA be brought in from the cold? “)

Another prominent Unionist group is the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Since its creation 1966, the group has been responsible for approximately 480 deaths (“Northern Ireland: the Troubles”). The response to a ceasefire by the IRA, the UVF declared its acquire ceasefire in 1994. An piquant force has weakened the UVF. Internal feuding and conflicts with other Unionist groups has contributed to their decrease in recent activity (Terrorism Knowledge Spoiled). Their last attack was the 10 February 1998 shooting of a Loyalist Volunteer Force member, Mark Fulton. Although still considered an active paramilitary group, the UVF has taken the same direction as the UDA. They are eager in a considerable amount of organized crime, which has weakened their public support. The UVF has also taken steps toward peace. In September 2006, the UVF reengaged in the process of decommissioning (“Empey heralds possible UVF move”).

Unionists are also familiar with splinter groups. Disenchanted members of the UVF found satisfaction in a new splinter group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). The LVF did not agreed with the UVF’s involvement in the peace process and 1994 ceasefire. Since its formation in 1997, it has been involved in attacks on republican groups, civilians, and other loyalist groups resulting in the deaths of 20 people (“Northern Ireland: the Troubles”). Following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the LVF declared a ceasefire in May 1998 and decommissioned some of its arms in hopes of the release of some of its prisoners. Throughout their ceasefire the LVF has been involved in organized crime and drug dealing. Their last violent attack came on 25 February 2003 when the home of a Catholic family was bombed. However, since the conflict between the LVF and the UVF decreased so has the violence perpetrated by the LVF (“Optimism over loyalist feud”).

The analysis of terrorist organizations from both sides of the conflicts reveals the profound enact that the Good Friday Agreement has had on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. It is unreasonable for a single agreement to completely stop all terrorist activity in an instant. The Good Friday Agreement cannot claim that it has completely rid the region of violence. However, the dramatic decrease in fatalities after 1998 and the movement of organizations on both sides of the conflict towards peace negotiations bodes for the effectiveness of the agreement. Martha Crenshaw states, “The practitioners of terrorism often claim that they had no choice but terrorism…” (10). The agreement has presented the terrorist organizations with a viable alternative to terrorism, giving them a voice and power in politics. Most of the organizations have taken advantage of this opportunity and are slowly, but steadily, making the sail towards peaceful diplomatic means of settling their conflicts.

Conclusion

As Senator George Mitchell stated, “It is important for everyone to recognize that the Agreement does not, by itself, provide or guarantee peace, political stability or reconciliation. It makes them possible, but there will have to be a lot of effort in good faith for a long time to achieve those results” (88). The Good Friday Agreement does not guarantee the end of terrorist and paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. Rather, the agreement place forth provisions that if followed could set up the political and constitutional changes necessary for the peace process to continue. The agreement was an effort on behalf of the British and Irish Governments to enable all involved parties to consume political, diplomatic to solve their conflicts, rather than resorting to violent methods to get attention.

Establishing the principle of self-determination of the Northern Ireland Governments was coupled with the creation of the North/South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council in an effort to lessen the influence of the two authorities while at the same time appeasing both the Unionists and the Nationalists. The creation of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive was intended to grant Northern Ireland with devolved powers so that they may work together in a consocialtionistic fashion to peacefully settle the issues and concerns of their diverse ethno-religious population.

Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was the hardest impartial, given the symbolism it carried for the terrorist groups of Northern Ireland. However, it was also essential to providing the political trust vital for the peace process to move forward. Its continued progress is a positive sign for hopes of peace. Trust in the police and security forces of Northern Ireland was also principal to restore order. The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland has made necessary steps to establishing an unbiased, nonpartisan police force aimed at protecting all citizens of Northern Ireland. Efforts have been made to reduce economic equality and in turn reduce the grievances of many Nationalists.

The incidence of terrorist activities following the agreement has declined. Most of the paramilitary groups that have brought destruction and death to the region have publicly committed themselves to the peace process. The appeal of peaceful tactics has increased substantially and the terrorist groups have taken advantage of the opportunities a more inclusive Northern Ireland Assembly has afforded them.

The real effectiveness of the Good Friday Agreement is yet to be seen. Progress has been made, but the road to long-lasting peace in Northern Ireland is a long, turbulent journey and the final destination is still far in the distant future. However, the institutions put in state by the Good Friday Agreement have paved a path for the peace process to follow. If the violent political groups of the region are serious in their commitments to reaching peaceful resolutions, the Good Friday Agreement has provided them with the tools to realizing this goal.

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The Good Friday Agreement Image

The Good Friday Agreement Photo

The Good Friday Agreement Pic

The Good Friday Agreement Image

The Good Friday Agreement Picture

The Good Friday Agreement Photo